The Dayton Peace Agreement created a complex political structure with three constituent nations, two powerful entities - a Serb entity and the Bosniak-Croat entity - and power-sharing on many levels of government. The agreement also included a civilian international administration, the Office of the High Representative, and a NATO military presence which would ensure the implementation of the agreement. The agreement guaranteed the Bosnian Croats one member in the three-person presidency and also equal representation in the upper house of Parliament which provided for a veto over ‘vital national interests’. Moreover, in the Bosniak-Croat entity (The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) power is internally devolved and ten cantons enjoy significant autonomy: three of these are predominantly Croat while two are mixed. A number of power-sharing mechanisms are built into the entity’s structure: the upper chamber of the legislature is based on parity and concurrent majorities are required for issues involving vital national interests. Finally, the entities are allowed to establish ‘special parallel relationships’ with neighboring states, i.e. with Croatia and with Yugoslavia (The General Framework Agreement 1995). Consequently, the Dayton Agreement guaranteed the Bosnian Croats a significant share in power and permitted continued links with Zagreb. However, it fell short of providing the Croats with their own entity. But the reality of post-war Bosnia differed in important respects: although ‘Herceg-Bosna’ had officially ceased to exist in 1994, when the Washington Agreement was signed, a de facto Croat entity continued to exist. Parallel institutions had never been dismantled and they were generously funded by Zagreb and by the shadow economy. Bosnian Croat politics was still entirely dominated by the HDZ which pursued a policy of obstructing the implementation of the Dayton Agreement; in particular regarding the reintegration of the city of Mostar. Relations with Zagreb were characterized by mutual dependence: Zagreb continued supporting the Bosnian Croat leadership through direct payment of benefits and salaries, but President Tudjman also needed the support of the Herzegovina Croats who still voted in Croatian elections (see, for example, Bose 2002). However, things began to unravel with the death of Tudjman in 1999 and the coming to power of a non-HDZ Croatian Government in 2000 (ibid. 142ff). The international High Representative saw this as a chance to adopt a more assertive policy against the ‘third entity’ and growing tensions soon escalated into a full-blown crisis. The HDZ had been left marginalized at the state-level when in early 2001 the ‘Alliance for Change’ formed a new non-nationalist Bosnian government. This setback did, however, not lead the HDZ to adopt a more accommodative position. On the contrary, the leadership decided to play on widespread insecurity among the Bosnian Croats to try to halt the erosion of its power. Such a strategy was aided by an ill-advised change to the electoral law, imposed by the High Representative, which could be seen as undercutting the Croat representation in the Federation House of Peoples. On 3 March 2001, the HDZ-led Croat National Congress (HNS) announced its decision to separate from the Bosniak-Croat Federation and establish “Croat self-government,” and justified this by arguing that the international community threatened the rights and survival of the Bosnian Croats (International Crisis Group 2001). As a response, the Office of the High Representative decided to cut off the illegal monetary flows that were believed to support the HDZ, and their parallel institutions, by raiding the Hercegovačka Banka and imposing a provisional administration. Already weakened by the loss of support from Croatia, the HDZ eventually gave in and embarked on a process of reform. The process of reform has, nevertheless, been accompanied by significant tensions within the HDZ. When the new leadership abandoned demands for a ‘third entity’ and embarked on a more moderate course, some hardliners chose to leave the party. But the leadership continued its conversion: it spoke warmly of a common state, of strengthened central institutions and of weakened entities, and even supported constitutional amendments which moved away from parity between the three nations, the so-called ‘April package’. This, however, proved too much for traditionalists in the party who argued that such a change would weaken the position of the Bosnian Croats. As a response they broke away from the party in April 2006 and formed the ‘HDZ 1990’, and the Bosnian parliament was unable to pass the constitutional amendments (International Crisis Group 2007). The more uncompromising position of the ‘HDZ 1990’ found some resonance with the Bosnian Croat electorate, but the split also introduced a healthy, and hitherto lacking, political pluralism into Bosnian Croat politics. The Bosnian Croats are no longer seen as a significant threat to Bosnian stability. But underlying their quiet support for compromise at the state level is a lingering dissatisfaction with their position, and relations at entity and cantonal levels are often marked by frictions and clashes (International Crisis Group 2009a). These are unlikely to turn violent (International Crisis Group 2009b), but they do reflect a Croat sense of unfairness along with attempts to secure separate institutions and hold on to existing powers. Even after the dismantling of the parallel structures, the Croat-dominated regions continued to function as a largely autonomous area with close links to Croatia proper, and the Croatian leaders are afraid of losing this. The fear of being dominated by the two larger communities is reinforced by their weakening demographic position: the Croat share of the population is estimated to have declined markedly from its pre-war levels and the Catholic Church even argues that the Bosnian Croat population has fallen to only 466,000, from 820,000 in 1995 (ibid.). A large number of people have emigrated to Croatia proper and in the border regions many people live with “one foot in Bosnia and the other in Croatia,” crossing the border in order to work, socialize, receive medical care or other benefits (International Crisis Group 2009a). With the announcement of the forthcoming closure of the Office of the High Representative these issues gained added urgency: what kind of Bosnia will the international administration leave behind and what will be position of the Croats in the future Bosnian state.[1] The case of the Bosnian Croats demonstrates that power-sharing and autonomy can provide relatively stable solutions to self-determination disputes. However, it also highlights the flexibility of demands and the crucial significance of internal divisions: the Bosnian Croats were, and are, divided not only over the most appropriate strategy to pursue but also over what it means to be a Croat in Bosnia. Different factions dominated at different times and these changes in the dynamics of Bosnian Croat politics greatly influenced the range of feasible solutions. A crucial factor for these internal developments was the position of the kin-state, Croatia, and the overall availability of resources which could help sustain a maximalist position. The position of the kin-state greatly impacted on the demands made and the stability of the post-war power-sharing structure. Finally, the case highlights the potential advantage of an ambiguous and flexible settlement that has allowed the Croats greater autonomy in practice than on paper. This has helped mitigate any new conflicts and subdued any violent nationalism. However, it also adds to anxieties over changes to the structure, especially at a time when the international community is getting ready to leave. [1] The Office of the High Representative was intended to close in June 2008, but the closure has been postponed until a set of benchmarks have been met.